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Excerpts From the Critiques
of CIA Graduates of the
National Interdepartmental Seminar
(February 1968 - May 1969)

Attachment 1

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[] - 43rd Session (21 April - 9 May 1969)

" . . . I feel the Seminar attains its stated objective which, basically, is to provide a broad view of the USG's problems of foreign policy with special emphasis on the developing countries. The presentations by the visiting lecturers from the academic world were uniformly excellent as were most of the presentations by Government speakers. Since most of us are inclined to become parochial in our views, the broad coverage provided by the curriculum was useful as a means of broadening students' views, but I do believe that the subject matter could be better tailored to the basic interests of the class. In our class for example, the majority of those attending were scheduled for ARA assignments. More emphasis on LA case studies (at the expense of India or Africa) would have been useful. Despite this comment, I believe Agency participation is useful . . ."

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[] - 43rd Session (21 April - 9 May 1969)

Value to the Agency of our Participation in the Seminar

"Limited. The three week time period of the participation of our officers, and whatever share of money cost to the Agency of administering the Seminar is not worth the value we obtain. The Seminar has evolved into an introduction for senior military

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officers to the conduct and difficulties of U.S. foreign affairs. It is also a forum for speakers from the universities, foundations, and from within the U.S.G.

Some of the lectures are worthwhile, but are not worth the Agency's cost in time and money. It would cost less if these same speakers were invited to speak at Agency courses such as the COS seminar."

Value to our Students of Attendance at the Seminar

"I was disappointed. I thought this group of senior officers would examine foreign affairs problems seriously at a level which would assume a considerable knowledge in that field. Instead, I found the military officers (who were a majority in the seminar) of low sophistication in foreign affairs. The seminar spent too much of its time in educating them thus had almost no time to study anything seriously. Frankly, most of the time I was bored, particularly in the afternoons when the small group seminar I was in spent most of its time in small, small talk to eat up the clock until 1700."

Evaluation of our Participation

"From what I was able to observe our participation on the platform and in the seminar stimulated interest and discussion in what otherwise would have been extreme dullsville."

Overall Evaluation of the Seminar with Regard to its Objectives

"The following is a quote from the note of welcome sent to all students by the coordinator of the Seminar:

The Seminar is a unique, classified, interdepartmental

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program of intensive study and training on (a) problems of development and internal defense in developing countries, and (b) the application and coordination of agency resources and programs to help meet these problems when they affect our national interest.

I have no doubt that for the uninitiated (which would be the majority in the Seminar, including the military officers) the Seminar met its objectives, but it did not do so for me. Lectures were the main format, not "intensive study and training". Part (a) from the above quote was touched on lightly, part (b) seemed to be the goal of the seminar but it was never reached; i.e., the Seminar never grappled with the application of government resources to resolve the problems confronting it. Too much time was spent on explaining the problems, almost no time to suggested solutions."

Suggestions

1. "We should withdraw from participation in the Seminar at all levels.
2. As with USIA, we should engage in "tokenism", i.e., continue to supply one faculty member and send one or two students to each session. This alternative however, would not reduce our share of the cost in maintaining the Seminar."

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- 43rd Session (21 April - 9 May 1969)

"I found this a tired, uninspired course. The faculty is tired;

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the course is poorly organized. It obviously no longer attracts the attention and support of senior governmental officials. Still trying to maintain the momentum given the course by Robert Kennedy, the staff pretends that the NIS is much more than it really is. Far from providing a comprehensive picture of how the U.S. Government makes its foreign policy and coordinates its operations abroad, the course gives a more confused picture of the present state of U.S. foreign operations than is actually justified by reality.

Almost any Clandestine Services officer of sufficient talent and experience to be appointed to a senior position abroad will already know practically everything he is supposed to be learning in this course. Consequently, the course is a waste of these men's time. They may, depending on the circumstances of a given course, get to know a few people from other agencies with whom they will have some relationships in the field - but this is a very minor, accidental and overrated benefit from the course. The real gain from the NIS to a future COS or COB is likely to be so slight as to make it irrelevant whether he attends the course or not.

It can be argued that though our people may gain nothing from the course, they contribute something by their very presence. To some degree this is undoubtedly true. This, again, is a very haphazard process, however, and the question arises whether the same effect could not be achieved in a cheaper and less time-consuming fashion - e.g., by inviting military and DOD men of the

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type who attend this course to come to our building for a day of concentrated briefing on our own ground which we could make much more impressive than the present Agency contribution to the NIS.

Our participation in the course still entails a degree of security erosion which needs to be taken into account in any estimate of the net advantage/disadvantage of Agency involvement. I have the impression that, in general, the level of people sent by most agencies to this course has been declining. (State and USIA send very few people; AID sends a very mixed group.) The military send a great number of officers and some civilians who really have no need to know much, if anything, about our Agency's operations abroad. Nevertheless, the present manner of our participation in this course identifies our officers to everyone in the course and results in exposure of a considerable accumulation of data about our targets and methods of operation. I am not naturally inclined to be highly conservative on this kind of issue, but I feel uneasy about this aspect of our involvement with the course. It is time to reexamine it again.

Though the course in toto is not our basic responsibility, our long participation in it and the financial contribution we make to it entitle us as an Agency to raise questions about its current and future relevance. Like long-existing projects and long-standing procedures, courses even as prestigious as the NIS should be thoroughly reviewed from time to time. If it is

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not politic for our Agency to call into question the existence of the course as such, we are guilty of not looking after our own interests if we do not periodically reconsider whether we are getting our money's worth out of what we are putting into it. Perhaps we are; if we are, it is not clear to me just what the gain for us is."

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 43rd Session (21 April - 9 May 1969)

"I believe the Agency benefits by association with other government organization representatives in appropriate forums to allay frequent misunderstandings of the purpose of this Agency and the style and character of its representatives. In short, it is good public relations for us to participate in open and candid fashion with other department representatives as often as possible to generate confidence and understanding in our purpose. For this to be effective, I think it should be relatively senior personnel who are familiar with the intricacies and mores of inter-departmental relations and problems. Because our representatives usually are senior and have had broad and extensive exposure to a variety of events and problems, attendance at such seminars usually is of much less benefit than to the normal participants. For instance, there was little that I heard at the NIS that I had not heard and discussed in considerable detail before. Similarly, material available at

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the library offered little that was new to anyone who follows current events in reasonably organized fashion. What is of some value, however, is the breaking out of rather confined routine to which most of us are subjected. It is a welcome type of sabbatical that gives one time to reflect and exchange views on a variety of subjects with other than his immediate colleagues. The closeness and restrictions of Agency procedures and associations tend to become incestuous, and the break out from time to time is refreshing.

The present curriculum of the NIS is only a slight variation from the original concentration on counterinsurgency and, for this reason, I believe, is too reactionary and defensive in nature. There seems to be a dearth of challenging new concepts presented but more a rehash of the established order. Among the most provocative and challenging speakers were those from outside the usual government areas. George Cabot Lodge and Richard Parker I found particularly stimulating by their posing new concepts and possible actions contrary to the "standard" line.

Agency representatives were more active and effective generally in the individual group seminars than in general assembly proceedings, possibly because of natural Agency influences. Agency representatives seemed popular targets during intermission time for buttonholing on questions and proposals revealing, as usual, much ignorance on the Agency

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in general. . . .

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- 43rd Session (21 April - 9 May 1969)

" . . . I believe there was some value to the Agency in our participation in the Seminar, but just how much value is difficult for me to assess. . . .

I was in a section of the Seminar (Regional Seminar for Latin America) where fifteen students were from other agencies, with most of the 15 from DOD - there were two of us from the Agency. It is my belief that the Agency students derived little benefit from the Seminar. Most of the DOD officers benefitted a great deal more, in my observation because much of the material presented was new information to them. For Agency personnel, the material covered for the most part was not new, nor were the concepts of the great majority of the lecturers whether from the government or from academic or other circles. Probably there were no more than six or seven of the lectures which I considered to be significant for me, whereas in the case of the DOD members, most of the lectures seemed to present material to which they had been exposed to a limited degree if at all.

The informal discussions held with members of my own regional group were enjoyable, and I believe contributed to a good relationship."

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 - 43rd Session (21 April - 9 May 1969)

"I believe that several advantages accrued to the Agency from its participation in the Seminar. . . First of all, the Seminar provided senior personnel of other agencies with a better understanding of how CIA operates in overseas posts, how they can assist CIA in its operations, and how CIA can be of assistance to them. It was obvious from the numerous questions from State, AID, and Defense personnel that a need existed for explaining CIA's clandestine mission. The Seminar also provided an opportunity to explain the overt intelligence support that the Agency can make available to US officials assigned to foreign countries. There were several occasions when I personally had an opportunity to provide answers regarding the nature and extent of Communist foreign aid activities in selected countries. As an outgrowth of these questions, I was asked to give a special presentation on the subject of Soviet military and economic aid in the developing countries.

As a result of my participation in the Seminar, I have a better understanding of and appreciation for the roles of other Agencies in carrying out US foreign policy interests in the developing countries. I also feel that I acquired a better understanding of the problems facing the developing countries as well as an improved framework for analyzing

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these problems. I also would lay stress on the broadened education that I acquired as a result of informal discussions and interchange of ideas with other senior government officials who participated in the Seminar. . . .

I believe that the Seminar adequately fulfills its two-fold objective of (a) providing the student with an understanding of the problems of development and internal defense, and (b) acquainting the student with the various resources of government that can be employed to carry out US foreign interests. Most of the presentations by Government and non-Government speakers were good to excellent. . . ."

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[] - 42nd Session (24 February - 14 March 1969)

"My overall impression is that the National Interdepartmental Seminar is a worthwhile experience for Agency personnel in any case, and especially for those officers concerned with less developed areas. In addition to the information presented on the range of U.S. military and civilian assets that can be brought to bear on problems of development, the seminar offers an invaluable opportunity to meet and talk informally and in depth with representatives from other agencies attacking the same or similar targets. . . ."

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[] - 42nd Session (24 February - 14 March 1969)

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provoking, and informative. There were certainly many outstanding speakers from the academic world as well as the governmental officials and the faculty. With a few minor exceptions, the speakers were all excellent. Some of the more impressive ones that come to mind are: Harriman, Lodge, Levy, and Weiner. There were many others too that I could commend. The military show, in my opinion, was the weakest part. On the Agency presentation I believe a little more time should be allowed for questions from the audience.

The format of the course with the mornings devoted to lectures and discussions and the afternoons utilized as regional seminars seem to me to be a most effective method of handling the program. We in the Eastern Asia Regional Seminar were fortunate in having several people who had served extensive tours in Thailand and in South Vietnam. This certainly provided material for some excellent seminars on the area.

My views on the AID program were altered to quite a degree. I'm afraid I had always harbored an idea that a large part of it was in effect a "give away" program. I'm sure there is little of this feature left, if it was ever there, since the allocation for this purpose has been trimmed down to such an extent. The continuing stress on the national interest by many of the speakers certainly emphasized this position.

The selection of reading material was excellent although I was not able to cover all of it. There should be more copies

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of some of the required reading as I found it quite difficult to obtain all the books and articles on a timely basis. I have been continuing some of the suggested reading since the course ended and must admit that such reading has whetted my appetite for more of the same and I have been exploring some other works by these authors.

The EA seminar devoted a good share of its time to investigating the dissident youth of today, believing that it can be easily related to problems of dissident peoples in emergent nations. I believe this was an exercise worth while and there is much understanding to be gained from such an exercise.

It seems that the elimination of the fourth week from the course has been detrimental somewhat. I believe that the former field trips must have been far more effective in presenting that phase of the course than the somewhat less than inspiring contributions made by the special school representatives.

The most valuable thing I gained from the seminar was a much greater understanding of how things work. I have a much better perspective now of world affairs. I believe that there is much to be gained from the course by the managerial element of the Agency, of which I am a part, as well as the operational people."

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 - 42nd Session (24 February - 14 March 1969)

"In my opinion the NIS Course definitely met its objectives

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and my evaluation of it is excellent. Over-all, I would say
that there is great value to the Agency resulting from selected
senior participation. I imagine most COS's attend the course.
If they do not, they should since these are the men who would
benefit the most from a common understanding of the problems

[REDACTED]

To a lesser

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extent DCOS's would derive the same benefit. For the rest of
us, I feel the main benefit is the broadening of one's background
(plus the break from daily routine). In my case I not only ac-
quired a tremendous understanding of the problems in developing
countries but also a much better understanding of international
relations in general, particularly in the Near East.

Over-all, your speakers were top notch, and I felt they gave us a good cross section of the problems. . . .

The Case Study approach is a good approach and I feel they were geographically representative. . . .

The reading list and my efforts to complete as much of it as possible were somewhat of a cultural shock! It was, however, tied-in well with the material covered by the speakers and in the seminars, and I was able to cover much of it. . . ."

The seminar is well organized. Your staff handles the students efficiently and courteously. . . . The Fort Meyer lunches were highly appreciated. I suggest you go on all three Fridays. By Friday the interlude is appreciated. The lunch period film program contributes to the intent of the course and

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in general the films were well selected and timely. . . ."

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[REDACTED] 42nd Session (24 February - 14 March 1969)

"I feel the Agency derives definite benefits from participation in the HIS and should continue the relationship both from a recipient and a contributor standpoint. Some of the advantages are as follows:

A) One of the most outstanding immediate benefits is that it affords our people excellent contacts with individuals who in a great many instances will be serving in a liaison or coordinating function at the participant's next assignment. A common ground is established which can greatly enhance the Agency's position in the long run.

B) Allows for concentration of effort, study, and resources on the participant's intended place of assignment. The sources available are generally good and intimate contact with personnel of other Agencies allows for testing the internal sources of those Agencies.

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D) Affords the Agency a small but effective means of "advertising." That is to say, it gives us a sounding-board to promote better understanding of our mission and problems. I heard other participants mention on several occasions that

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one of the advantages to them in the course was that they gained a better understanding of the Agency and what it was trying to do.

E) Gives a good insight into the country's problems from a national standpoint.

I think the Seminar accomplished its objectives very well. The speakers and staff were generally good . . . I believe the Seminar was especially informative and productive."

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2nd Session (24 February - 14 March 1969)

Value of the Agency of our participation in the Seminar:

"Orientation and education of DDP officers in command positions in matters of policy initiation and implementation at the highest levels and a general education in the concepts, actions, alternatives, and limitations on the US Government in the general field of counterinsurgency/political action.

The opportunity to dispell some serious misconceptions about the Agency in general and the DDP in particular which were held by senior officers of other agencies, particularly State/AID.

The opportunity to meet, assess, and develop opposite numbers in other agencies in seminar and social milieu.

In amplification of the latter two points, the undersigned observed at the inception of the course that there was an almost uniform guarded reserve or hostility on the part of the participants of other agencies towards the DDP (with the exception of

the military participants). The undersigned believes that at

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the conclusion of this course this hostility or reserve was
in most cases broken down and replaced with a more positive
appreciation of the Agency, its DDP officers, and the DDP
contribution toward the total US overseas effort. This was
due to the candor of the Agency participants in the lectures
and post-lecture discussions coupled with the excellent in-
dividual efforts of the Agency participants--not necessarily
treating other agency members as operational targets but more
naturally by candidly participating in post-lecture, seminar,
and bull session discussions. Significant in this regard was
the high personal and intellectual caliber of the Agency
participants. (Several members of other agencies seemed
initially to suspect that DDP officers were mechanics rather
than thinkers--this misconception was rapidly dispelled.)
However, the one single aspect that seemed to have the most
favorable impact was the candor and frankness of the discussions
and lectures regarding the Agency's mission (particularly the
DDP).

Overall Evaluation of the Seminar:

" . . . the undersigned found two aspects of the seminar very
useful and two rather less so. The useful aspects included
the concentrated and intellectually high level of the seminar.
Truly distinguished minds presented their thoughts to the
seminar, and the undersigned received an intellectual stimulation
not felt for years. Secondly, it was a pleasure and of great
use to meet and trade thoughts with senior officers of other

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agencies as well as DDP colleagues previously not met.

On the debit side, the undersigned felt that the military point of view was overpresented and that the military was overrepresented. Honest discussion of problems was difficult when one met a solid phalanx--rather too solid and orchestrated--of colonels and generals all dogmatically asserting the same point of view. On the other hand, the Agency point of view, particularly the very well received COS panel discussion, would have benefitted by more time than the 45 minutes or so allocated. On the same point, the lack of State Department representation (the second major debit) seriously curtailed effective discussion of a number of topics both in seminar and in post-lecture discussion.

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- 41st Session (6 - 24 January 1969)

"I found the National Interdepartmental Seminar a stimulating and broadening experience. It exposed me to aspects of national security with which I had not been familiar and afforded time for independent reading in these fields. It also exposed me to the provincialism of some of my Government associates, especially the military representatives. We of CIA tend to become provincial too and I believe it is valuable for us to be exposed to the "big picture" and our participation promotes a better understanding of CIA among our associates too. I heartily endorse continued Agency participation in the Seminar.

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I was disappointed by the lack of a sharper focus of the course. I think this was particularly evident in the so-called "case studies" of individual countries. I found all of them interesting and informative, but only one gave a clear-cut analytical evaluation of the key insurgency and developmental factors--factors which might also be applicable to any of the developing countries. This approach was more useful than a fact-filled, historical and general review of the other "case studies."

Course objectives might have been better served with less emphasis upon the broad brush (e.g., the outside professorial lecturers) and more on the specific views of practitioners. The objectives of the course are not served by an individual's personal reminiscences as much as by his analytical appraisal of the specific problems he faced--isolating and highlighting the specific components and giving practical examples of how to cope with each. The latter approach would help each student to recognize similar problems encountered in his anticipated overseas assignment and to consider several alternative responses."

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- 41st Session (6-24 January 1969)

"There are two possible areas where the NIS makes a contribution to the Agency. First, the NIS does a good job in preparing the individual officer to interact with non-Agency personnel in a work situation. Too often we tend to crawl into our own little secretive

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holes forgetting that we must perform our mission in relation with personnel of other agencies and in their view (This is particularly true of small stations.) It is particularly important for our middle grade officers to get over their fears of their other-agency associates before moving overseas to a position where they will have responsibility for interaction with them. The NIS serves this function. Secondly, Agency personnel at the NIS are so obviously superior to the general run of other agency participants that they are able to do a job of selling for the Agency. Their participation is a relatively painless and inexpensive way of demonstrating to other agency personnel that the Agency officers don't wear horns.

The seminar should be considered more of a brief, middle level seminar in problems of American foreign policy than a seminar on problems of development (with a strong smell of counter-insurgency). As presently administered the course content and the faculty itself demonstrate confusion as to the objectives of the course, almost as though there were two tendencies competing, one which holds to the traditional counter-insurgency concepts (How to combat guerrilla wars) and one which is more interested in the economic development of the LDC's. ☐

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 - 40th Session (21 October - 15 November 1968)

" . . . While the academic and intellectual level of the National Interdepartmental Seminar remains high, the course is showing signs of age. The in-put from the academic sector is brilliantly presented but needs up-dating because it is obvious by now that many theoretic concepts of social scientists and economists on nation building - which heavily influenced the early days of the Kennedy Administration and which are reflected in the course - simply did not work. Yet these theories remain an important part of the course and constitute the bulk of the ambitious required reading. . . .

The overall quality of the MIS Faculty is high. The level and potential of the student body is more varied. . . .

The intellectual level of the Seminar is high. Speakers from the academic sector included Professor Cyril E. Black, Director of the Princeton Center of International Studies, on "Dynamics of Modernization," Professor Marion J. Levy from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs of Princeton University on "Social Change in Traditional Societies," Professor Pye from MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) on "Problems of Political Development, and George Lodge of Harvard Business School on "Political Institutions in the Revolutionary World." The Department of State provided four Assistant Secretaries of State, the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, five Ambassadors and two retired Ambassadors. The principal military speaker was

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General Chapman, Commandant of the Marine Corps. . . .

In terms of inter-agency relations, the NIS weighs in heavily in emphasizing the primary role of the Department of State and of the Ambassador. This is reflected both in the choice of speakers and in the required reading, which includes papers of the Jackson Committee on Government Operations discussing the role of the U.S. Ambassador and Roger Hillsman's book "To Move a Nation." The point is that a steadily increasing number of senior personnel are going to the field - and we now have more than 30 Ambassadors who graduated from the NIS - with the impression that the Ambassador is in charge of all operations.

The discussions with the Deputy Assistant Secretaries (Handley and Davies from the Near East, Winthrop Brown from Far East, and Vaky from ARA) were uniformly interesting and candid. There was no attempt to gloss over any problems and as might be expected under the circumstances we were left with more questions than solutions.

A highlight of the course was the presentation by General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, on our world-wide commitments in which he emphasized the limitations of U.S. military power under the existing Circumstances and the prospects in Viet Nam. General Chapman explained the conditions under which the JCS could (and subsequently did) accept the bombing halt and was emphatic that the JCS could not accept a halt in aerial reconnaissance in contrast to a bombing halt. He felt that

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an armistice along the existing lines of fighting would be unacceptable to South Viet Nam.

Other speakers of outstanding quality were Ambassador Marchall Green on "Development and Internal Defense in Indonesia," William C. Doherty, Jr., Executive Director, AIFLD, on "Labor and Its Influence in the Underdeveloped World," Undersecretary Bohlen on U.S.-Soviet relations, and Colonel Irwin R. Brigham, now with SACS and just back from Saigon, on "Internal Defense in Viet Nam." Colonel Brigham was highly complimentary of CIA's role in the Viet Nam. . .

In conclusion, there can be no doubt that the NIS contributes to the educational and experience levels of its students. Much of what is presented is challenging, and most of it is interesting, but I question that it is directly applicable to the work of the Chief of Station. In fact, if there is one definitive conclusion to be gained from the course it is that each is different, each problem must be viewed in terms of the specifics and that overall, "school solutions" simply do not exist. The course makes no attempt at value judgments; one speaker may say that the Peace Corps is wonderful, to be followed by a senior Ambassador who makes a persuasive case why the Peace Corps should not be admitted to his particular country - and there it is left. Similar contradictions could be found between the views of Mr. Doherty and Assistant Secretary Vaky on the U.S. Labor's role in South America, or between the views of Assistant Secretary Brown and some military speakers on what went wrong in Viet Nam.

These differences certainly reflect honesty of approach to academic freedom.

On balance, I think the NIS has outlived its usefulness.
Its central theme is by now well accepted. Enough of its
graduates are in senior positions throughout the Services,
State and the other participating agencies to insure that
the doctrine will live on. Some features of the NIS could
be absorbed into internal CIA training, as it is absorbed
into the various service schools and the Foreign Service
Institute. The NIS by-product of better understanding of
other Agencies' interests could be accomplished more effective-
ly by extending to the Foreign Service the USEFUL Project."

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- 40th Session (21 October - 15 November 1968)

The basic objectives of the course:

" . . . I feel were more than adequately met. Comments that I heard from members of the seminar, including officers of our Agency, indicated that those destined to positions in the field would be able to make a more substantial contribution in their new assignment relative to furthering U.S. policy especially in the developing countries.

Although my current assignment is in Washington, it does in-
volve supervising young professionals during their initial tour
with CIA. I feel that the seminar has increased my ability to
orient these new potential officers toward U.S. policy and in

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the general role the Agency should play in furthering foreign policy objectives.

I felt the subject matter of the course was well chosen and conducive to reaching the objectives of the seminar. I also felt that the balance between the lectures and the afternoon discussions and briefings was very good. Although the morning lectures were more pointed towards the stated goals of the course, the afternoon sessions allowed more individual and specific questions to be answered. I was not able to read as much as I would have liked but I do not believe that any more time should be set aside for reading. I intend to continue reading from the recommended list. . . .

. . . In conclusion, I would like to thank those whose efforts provided me with a most rewarding experience--not only the exposure to highly-qualified experts during the formal sessions but also the association with capable officers of other U.S. Government agencies."

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39th Session (9 September - 4 October 1968)

"I do believe there is a value to the Agency from our participation in NIS. The value as I see it is two fold: We can't help but learn something and while not everything is applicable learning per se is bound to make us better officers; perhaps more important however is that by participating in NIS the officers of other Agencies come to know us, to realize that we

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As touched upon above I think that we are bound to learn from exposure to ideas put forth at the NIS. I'm not at all of the view that participation at the 39th session will make me function as an Ops Officer abroad better or worse than I have in the past. I am convinced however that I have obtained greater awareness of the need for team effort in overseas activities, and such awareness should make me function more effectively in a senior managerial/operational role in future overseas assignments. I'd had a big dose of team cooperation [REDACTED] and was, thus, perhaps more aware of the needs than some Ops Officers--for them I feel the NIS would prove even more valuable.

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I would suggest that we might participate just a bit more than we currently do. A good hard-hitting lecture by a dedicated member of CI/ICG on the Communist threat in a given area should prove stimulating to the group as a whole then perhaps afternoon discussion within each team led by a CI/ICG area specialist. An equally hard-hitting summary lecture of the Soviet intelligence presence abroad should be of interest, and it would have the side effect of letting our American colleagues know that compared to the Soviets our own overseas Stations are tiny. I wonder how many of the students know the workings [REDACTED] and whether this might not be something you might touch on in your

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have heard generally and in which they expressed interest after our presentations). The [redacted] presence and its divisiveness (sp) needs attention.

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Perhaps the course could be somewhat compressed -- from my view I found some of the academic presentations dull hence time consuming. Also the reading reqs. are perhaps too extensive--had I not read almost all the pertinent classified material in years past could never have gotten through all that was required."

[redacted] - 39th Session (9 September - 4 October 1968)

"The greatest value to the student and in turn the Agency is a better understanding of overall foreign policy mechanics (or lack of it as the case may be) which transcend departmental boundaries and the necessity for a total U.S. approach and coordination. This is especially true regarding the underdeveloped nations.

The high quality, knowledgeable speakers and the candid presentation of as many aspects of the problems as possible contributed markedly to broadening the students perspective of the U.S. efforts in world affairs.

In my opinion participation in the Seminar by the Agency is an absolute necessity if we are going to be called upon to

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accomplish tasks in underdeveloped countries as we have in
the past. [REDACTED]

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The Seminar does a remarkable job in exposing the students to basic top-level thinking which accomplishes two objectives. First, given the nature of our government and the importance of individual contribution, exposure to basic ideas is paramount in educating the senior government official and stimulating thought. Second, as the basic thinking at the top level of government becomes widespread and permeates lower levels, the more coordinated and directed will be efforts at all levels. As the Seminar progressed, events of the recent past became more lucid and meaningful. Although there are mechanisms of coordination within the executive branch, a frightening depth of ignorance remains between agencies. As each agency developed its role toward the underdeveloped world, the curtain of suspicion and ignorance was partially torn away.

The comprehensive presentation of the developmental process through which countries undergoing some degree of modernization must pass was not only impressive and provocative but very practical also. The candid approach manifest by most participants was reassuring to the student that he was not being sold a bill of goods. The paradoxes which became evident and the many faceted complexities emphasized the magnitude of the overall foreign policy problem, particularly the attempt to develop a cogent policy toward the underdeveloped world. . . .

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The student will have to return to his own agency enlightened, sobered, and I should hope, inspired toward contributing his share in the total U. S. foreign effort. With the background and education provided by this seminar, he should become a catalyst in his own agency, thereby enhancing its total contribution."

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[REDACTED] 39th Session (9 September - 4 October 1968)

"The following comments are keyed to the suggested critique outline in your memorandum.

Participation is the key word, with the value inherent in reminding both our own and other-agency personnel that we are members of a team in both the field and at Hqs level. The people we join in the NIS are the people we work with here and overseas. The NIS appears to me to be a prime vehicle for promoting, or in some cases initiating mutual understandings that are bound to be of value to the Agency.

We are all in management positions and without exception conduct liaison with one or several of the other agencies involved in the NIS. The course helps get the blinders off for a while for anyone who might be having trouble seeing other-agency viewpoints. It would seem to me that students would therefore feel better able to handle their joint tasks and thereby derive professional satisfaction. . . .

The course structure, joint aspects, and truly impressive

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faculty certainly offer the natural ingredients for success in meeting the objectives. The key variable ingredient is the student body, smaller than usual . . . but, I have no doubt that the 39th Seminar will pay off. . . ."

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[redacted] 39th Session (9 September - 4 October 1969)

"I observed and concluded that there is considerable value to the Agency in its participation in the seminar. I believe that the participation of the Agency students and the formal Agency presentation served to clarify and solidify the Agency's role in carrying out the foreign objectives of the U.S. Government. The formal presentation was well presented and well received. . . .

For the most part I found the seminar to be interesting and rewarding. I was surprised that no Agency personnel designated to be Chiefs of Stations were present. (State Department personnel of ambassador rank and military personnel of General Flag rank were also noticeably absent.) [redacted]

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[redacted]

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In general I believe the seminar met its objectives - and in some respects in an outstanding manner. . . ."

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[redacted] 39th Session (9 September - 4 October 1969)

"Participation in this Seminar is of definite value to the

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dressing-up, and it is on this level of working field relations that it can count the most. My impression was one of considerable misunderstanding among our counter-parts in State, DOD, etc. of the real role of our Agency. Not surprisingly, some essentially negative feelings were sensed among our State Department colleagues, who it seemed developed these feelings more on hearsay and our 'bad press' than from first hand experience.

The Seminar is of definite value to our students in terms of broadening our views, providing the opportunity of hearing and discussing the thoughts of others with respect to our government's overseas problems and foreign policies. The opportunity to cease operations for a month, sit down and think, read and participate in such discussions is very worthwhile. Our students should of course have something to offer in this exchange and be active participants. . . .

In my opinion the Seminar meets its overall objectives very well. The right mix or balance of theory and practice, roles and cases is probably difficult to maintain but is essential to the success of the Seminar. Some students would apparently prefer more emphasis on the practical aspects of problem solving. This area should not be entirely neglected, but the value of the course is not to be found wholly in detailed descriptions of roles and techniques. Every participant should certainly have come

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away from the Seminar with a greater awareness of the character of the problems to which we are addressed and a better perception of the contributions to be made by all team members toward meeting these problems. . . ."

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[REDACTED] - 39th Session (9 September - 4 October 1968)

"The value to the Agency in participating in the National Inter-departmental Seminar (NIS) depends on what students are selected for attendance. I believe the DD/P officers receive the greatest benefit because they are the ones who will be members of the

[REDACTED]

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DD/S officers obtain, of course, a considerable amount of area and general knowledge, but it would be difficult to put this knowledge to use in practical support service activities. All attendees receive the benefit of making contacts for their future assignments so that when one is assigned to an overseas station or base he can look up the fellows from the other participating agencies who attended the NIS with him.

. . . From the overall standpoint, I feel that NIS does a fine job in carrying out its objectives of explaining our foreign internal defense policy and the various problems incident to development and internal defense in the less developed countries. . . ."

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[REDACTED] - 39th Session (9 September - 4 October 1968)

" . . . I am sure that our student attendees acquired a better

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understanding of how other U.S. departments and agencies help achieve our common foreign policy objectives. With this added knowledge, each student should be able to do his own job more effectively and with broadened understanding. Indirectly, then, the Agency should benefit in terms of an added capacity on the part of those who attended the Seminar. I feel, also, that each of our students did what he could to strengthen the image of the Agency during the course of the Seminar.

I guess that I spoke to practically every one of our students at one time or another, either on or off the "campus," so to speak. Each one had a very high regard for the Seminar. I believe that the CIA students learned a great deal about how the five Government agencies participating in the Seminar contribute to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Only too often, the individual intelligence officer, engrossed as he is with daily tasks, is unaware that other agencies may be engaged in programs which affect the work he is doing. Participation in the Seminar gave each of our officers a person-to-person updating on what others in the community are doing. . . .

I believe that Seminar objectives were accomplished, as demonstrated by the obvious increased awareness on the part of our students. I know that Team 4, of which I was a member, really discussed the subject matter in great depth during the afternoon sessions. . . ."

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[redacted] 39th Session (9 September - 4 October 1968)

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"I believe that the NIS provides selected Agency personnel
a unique opportunity to discuss problems of inter-agency con-
cern related to development and internal defense. Since the
[redacted] since heavy
emphasis is given to field problems, the seminar is much more
suitable for field personnel, especially those enroute to over-
seas posts in developing areas. Because of the particularly
heavy accent given Vietnam, it is suggested that all Agency
personnel grades GS-13 and above assigned to that country be
enrolled in the course. Similarly, the seminar ought to be made
mandatory for middle and senior grade personnel departing for
posts in developing countries which are deemed to be critical
areas.

It is impossible for me to separate the value of the seminar to Agency students and to the Agency as such, since the increment of growth of understanding of each student will redound to the benefit of the Agency. However, the Agency might derive further direct benefit from the seminar by utilizing some of the objectives, techniques, and participants in some of its own internal training programs (it is presumed that this is already being done in such courses as those provided by the Office of Training for personnel slated for duty in Vietnam). . . .

It is highly desirable (for the Agency) to keep the quality of students at a high level and not be tempted to enroll people who

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may simply be available to take the seminar. Such a practice might serve to lower the quality of participants and would have the long range effect of lowering the high esteem in which we are apparently held by our fellow students. With the continuing participation of Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Bohlen, and other such high-powered speakers, it would be a major mistake for the Agency to send mediocre or poor people in order to fill its quota.

It would be easy to carp about the lack of effectiveness of some speakers. However, in view of the fact that speakers are drawn from a wide variety of institutions, both in and out of government, it is probably inevitable that the quality will vary widely and that a number of presentations will be pedestrian or worse. What is more important is the point that a broad cross-section of opinions and points of view continue to be represented in the seminar. Such a cross-section serves as an effective catalyst to stimulate student discussions. . . ."

25X1

38th Session (8 July - 2 August 1968)

"This critique should be considered from the point of view of the participant's background as a psychologist without overseas experience. Thus, much of the data imparted during the seminar, being new, was found to be highly informative. It was felt that the course was quite successful in providing me with a broad

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prospective, both historical and current, as regards approaches to counter insurgency, the problems of underdeveloped countries and US interests and policies. Of particular importance, it also provided information about the wide variety of resources that are available for countering subversion and insurgency. Thus, it would seem to me that the seminar experience would be a useful one for Agency employees going overseas, particularly

[REDACTED]

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I, personally, found the course exceedingly interesting and was grateful for the opportunity to attend. Even though I am in a Headquarters slot, I feel there will be intangible benefits reflected in my role in selection activities. I think that the benefits might be more direct and tangible for personnel assigned overseas. . . .

One of the principal benefits, and one that cannot be directly measured, is that personal relationships are established that will facilitate future interaction with (other) Agency personnel stationed abroad. I believe that the course does open channels for better communication, particularly among those who will be

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. . . I certainly do feel that the Agency should continue to participate, as clarification of the Agency's role and function, [REDACTED] can be useful to all members taking the seminar."

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38th Session (8 July - 2 August 1968)

"In my opinion, the overall value of the seminar was good, and that it did achieve the intended purpose--that of stressing the team concept in the conduct of operations for overseas missions. Of particular value to me were the discussions regarding problems of development and internal defense in areas of the world which I was not familiar--Near East, Central Africa and Latin America with excellent lectures from those personally involved--Ambassador Deming, Wm. Connett and Ambassador Clark. . . ."

25X1



37th Session (22 April - 17 May 1968)

"The most obvious value is in the clarification of the minds of non-Agency officers of doubts or questions they had about the Agency's personnel and activities, which we tried to do in the morning Seminar led by Agency students in the third week. In the team discussions, I felt my main contribution was to keep alive the awareness that the world Communist domination is still very much a threat, since I was surprised to find that some of the State participants seemed to believe that there have been some significant changes in the over-all Soviet strategy and that the Soviets are not as determined as they used to be to achieve world Communist domination. This was supplemented by a lecture by an African specialist in CI/ICG, and by [redacted] presentation. ... 25X1

From a personal standpoint, I found attendance at the Seminar

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a very broadening experience. While it has not made a measurable contribution to my work as a case officer, it did on the other hand bring me up to date on current U.S. Government policy. Also for me the discussions and debates of these general matters by our team were invaluable. But since I have served overseas many years, the aspect of interchange between officers of other government agencies was not as important to me as it might have been to officers with less overseas' experience. I learned little about what other agencies are doing that I did not already know. . . .

Basically I think the Seminar is worthwhile. It is unquestionably a broadening experience, particularly as regards the problems of modernization in the underdeveloped world, U.S. overseas internal defense policy. . . . and the current Soviet and ChiCom situation, policies, and activities. . . .

I also feel that the interchange of ideas between officers of different government agencies has a value which should foster greater understanding of the other fellow's position overseas, something which is definitely needed."

25X1

37th Session (22 April - 17 May 1968)

"In general, and much to my amazement, the National Interdepartmental Seminar . . . was more interesting than I had anticipated. Some of the speakers were horrible, but several were outstanding, and the seminar group for Latin America was both stimulating and eminently sensible. There is a good little library in which much

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time can profitably be spent and the rules are relaxed enough to permit judicious absences. . . .

There were enough snide/friendly comments from other participants to show that our Agency is not well known to members of the military who have never been on attache assignments before. Their misconceptions seem to be drawn mainly from The Invisible Government and their DIA courses don't seem to have helped much. Thus we should fly our flag at these seminars both by sending students and speakers. A secondary objective of continuing our participation would be the time for reflexion that more participation in the course does allow, . . .

In addition to the time for reflexion, there was just enough of what is currently concerning other agencies (BALPA, Martin Report and CASPS as regards the Latin American area) and how the military look at certain problems to make it well worth my while to have attended. But I would, in retrospect, stress the reflective part as being of some value before the complete immersion which Agency life overseas demands."

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- 37th Session (22 April - 17 May 1968)

"I believe it to be both desirable and beneficial for the Agency to have a representation in the NIS. First, the Agency has a great deal to contribute; and secondly, it gives the Agency a voice in the conduct of the seminar. . . .

It has certainly broadened my views on the world situation and

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has given me an insight into the aspects dealing with the less developed countries. It has given me a much better understanding of the Country Team as a coordinating and planning mechanism and of the social, economic and political factors present in the modernization process.

The overall evaluation of the seminar - It was excellent throughout. It was a well balanced program consisting of lectures, seminars, and reading. . . ."

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37th Session (22 April - 17 May 1968)

"In general, I found the National Interdepartmental Seminar to be a useful and well run course. I would recommend that it continue, and that CIA officers continue to participate.

There is little in the NIS that is of immediate use to CIA officers going to the field, i.e. in the sense of conducting our own operations or day-to-day activity. However it should be of considerable use to most as a way of familiarizing themselves with the activities of other U.S. agencies working in the under-developed world. I do not believe that attendance should be mandatory for all senior CIA officers going to underdeveloped areas, as I understand is now the case, because I can well imagine that officers who have already completed a tour or more in such areas would find the course of little value. In addition I would not put it at the top of the list of things one must do to prepare oneself for a new tour and can also imagine cases where other

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courses such as language or self-briefing on an area would be more important than attending the NIS. Therefore flexibility as to attendance should be allowed. However in my case, the area is new and even some of the concepts concerning the work of AID and MAP were new to me. I found the NIS valuable as a concentrated familiarization period with such activities and a welcome respite to reflect on the more theoretical problems we face in countering insurgency around the world.

From the Agency's point of view, participation should be continued, both as public relations measure - to underline our existence and interest as one of the five U.S. agencies involved in counterinsurgency - and also to provide a certain leavening in the discussions which occur in the Seminar and sometimes tend to become far too theoretical and idealistic.

The Seminar itself was well run, and in general achieved most of its objectives. My only real criticisms are that: a) in our course, at least, there was far too little State Department participation and too many representatives from DOD. b) The WH discussion group was much too large for real seminar work. Ideally, DOD representation should have been cut to balance that of AID, USIS and CIA. Failing that, the group should have been divided in two. As in all courses of this type, some speakers were better than others but some were so poor as to warrant singling out for replacement. In general I found the presentations on specific topics better than those which tried to give a broad brush treatment to a huge subject. . . ."

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[REDACTED] 37th Session (22 April - 17 May 1968)

"It is my belief that CIA participation in this seminar affords certain advantage and is of definite value to the Agency. As in similar study groups, seminars or bodies composed of participants from many different departmental origins and agency backgrounds the individual comes to the course with a pre-conceived image of CIA and its mission. The image is in many instances totally amorphous, based on misconception and misinformation, usually completely confused and fallacious. Agency participation presents a unique opportunity to clarify such misconception and resolve pre-conceived distortions of the CIA by presenting the Agency in its true and proper perspective by ingenuous discussion of its aims, missions and contributions in the interdepartmental family. The Seminar permits this to be done in a natural and a truly professional atmosphere among equals and obviates any possible accusation of "hard-sell" or sleight-of-hand. I believe that as a forum the Seminar is unique in this respect and the rewards which the Agency may reap will be measurable only in the field after the participants embark on their many foreign assignments to work closely with Agency career officers abroad.

The value to Agency students of attendance at the Seminar would seem to devolve from the many opportunities provided to exchange ideas with individuals of diverse background and experience, the cross-fertilization of concepts and interpretations

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of foreign policy, U.S. military objectives and the broad discussion of problems to be encountered abroad. Considerable value obtained from the introduction of highly competent professionals as guest lecturers and from the opportunity provided to question each one and to discuss his subject as it applied to U.S. foreign objectives." . . .

I would evaluate Agency participation in this particular seminar as overall high and proficient. . . . This, by the way, is not just a matter of personal analysis but my evaluation is gleaned from the many commendatory comments relative to CIA participation which were voluntarily offered by fellow students from the other agencies. . . ."

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. 36th Session (26 February - 22 March 1968)

"General weaknesses:

The course does not have a convincing focus. As it was originally set up, it was an Interagency seminar to study the problems of handling insurgency situations. It still is. At least lip service is given to the theme of "counter-insurgency." But in the seven years since "counter-insurgency" came into vogue, a lot has happened. Most middle level and senior level officers of CIA and State have become thoroughly familiar--not only with the complex forces that bring about insurgent situations, but also the various successful and unsuccessful ways that our government has met those situations. This course, however,

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does not really take into account the high degree of awareness on the part of the class members of the roots of insurgency.

In short, the course seems still to put a great deal of emphasis on orienting the student to something which is, in my opinion, old hat.

A second major deficiency of the course is that it really has no answers. I do not mean that there should be a check list, such as a pilot uses before take-off. But I do think that there ought to be some general principles which are clearly enumerated by such a seminar faculty--if only to convey to the students the current government philosophy about counter-insurgency responsibilities and capabilities of the U.S. mission abroad.

For the most part, the course continually referred to the Vietnam situation when we tried to talk about specific situations. In actual fact, Vietnam is an insurgency in its terminal stages. As Rostow made very clear in his early book on the Stages of Economic Growth, it is only the first stage, before organized insurgency has taken root, that any effective, preventive action can be taken to offset a later violent insurgent situation. Thus, constant referral to Vietnam in this course only tends to negate the theoretical concepts of counter-insurgency.

Specific Weaknesses:

Six or seven lectures of the course are given to basic explanation of what the various agencies (State, CIA, AID, USIS, DOD) do abroad. In my opinion, it is absurd to take the time of middle and senior level government officers to brief them on the role and

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activities of, for example, USIS. If officers, with an average government experience of 15 to 20 years, do not know what the various responsibilities of these 5 agencies are by now, this is not the course to give them that briefing.

State Department Participation:


In the 36th Session there was one member of the State Department. I think this is absurd. . . .

Strong Points:

This four-week period enabled those of us in the seminar to do a great deal of in-depth reading which we probably would not have done--without the facilities of the seminar library at our disposal and the time set aside for such reading.

Some of the lectures were particularly good and interesting. I am particularly thinking of the case studies presented by Ambassadors (such as John S. Badeau, ex-Ambassador to Egypt). These case studies were excellent familiarization lectures on specific countries, by persons who had served there in positions of responsibility. They were the strong parts of the seminar, in my opinion. . . ."

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 36th Session (26 February - 22 March 1968)

"I believe that our participation was of great value to the Agency. I heard many of the other participants remark upon their favorable impression of the Agency personnel present. One could sense in them, I believe, a sort of feeling of

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reassurance concerning the Agency's mission and the checks and balances built into the system. I feel sure that many of the others also got a much better idea of the types of things which the Agency and other agencies can and should do for each other in the field.

In terms of my own experience only, the seminar was valuable in providing the broad picture of an integrated overseas mission; for example, despite about 8 years of field experience, I have never worked where AID was present at all, and prior to the seminar I had really very little idea of the types of problems which AID generally faces.

Whether or not the [] concept is good--and I think it is--it is inevitable, and the more we understand about it the better off we are.

Our presentations and panel were of very high quality, in my opinion. One could almost feel the impact on the others. . . . I personally heard a large number of participants say after our panel that it was the best thing of its type presented in the seminar. . . ."

[] - 36th Session (26 February - 22 March 1968)

"I believe it is definitely worthwhile for the Agency to participate in the Seminar as an important agency involved in foreign policy implementation and in the specialized problems of counter-insurgency. I think the course provides an important

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opportunity for the Agency to obtain wider and more accurate understanding of its role in the foreign policy and counter-insurgency fields on the part of the military, State, AID, and USIA participants.

I see three main benefits to our students in the course:

(1) the opportunity it provides to raise one's sights beyond the narrow confines of tradecraft and the clandestine approach to foreign affairs and to think in some depth about the broader problems of U.S. interests and foreign policy options. The reading available and the time allotted to reading was valuable in this connection. (2) the exposure during the course to responsible officers of other government agencies and departments, particularly the military. (3) the interesting and informative lectures, reading, and discussion of the practical problems of combatting Communist inroads in the developing world provide a useful framework for considering and planning CIA's role in this general counter-insurgency sphere.

. . . The Seminar was, overall, a valuable experience. . . .

I think the course suffered greatly from a confusion of purpose: confusion between a course in the problems of nation building or counter-insurgency and a course in the general sphere of U.S. foreign policy objectives, problems and programs. The course started out as the former but never came fully to grips with the practical problems involved and instead drifted off into more general consideration of U.S. strategic and political interests beyond the underdeveloped world alone."

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[REDACTED] - 36th Session (26 February - 22 March 1968)

"The Seminar has value, even though I consider it to be more a luxury than a necessity for Agency officers such as myself who have overseas experience in the LDCs. Its chief value, in my opinion, is that it is a broadening experience and affords an opportunity to obtain a better understanding of the complex problems and considerations which must be taken into account by all components in formulating and carrying out policies throughout the world. Obviously, this in turn will serve to increase the effectiveness of each Agency officer's contribution to his

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[REDACTED] forthcoming assignment overseas. However, from the Agency participant's point of view, a lot of the material, specifically many lectures, is old-hat and, quite frankly, a waste of time. I am well aware that the Seminar must be tailored to the requirements of all participants and that participants from each component will find certain material redundant but I believe this particularly applies to the Agency because of the very nature of the subject matter. In sum, and despite the above, I found the Seminar useful and a net gain. . . ."

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[REDACTED] - 36th Session (26 February - 22 March 1968)

"Probably the greatest value of our participation in the Seminar is that the other participants actually meet and, for many of them for the first time, receive an understanding of our

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duties and mission from an unbiased authority.

The value to our students in attendance at the Seminar appears to be in a better appreciation of the problems and objectives of our sister Agencies and Services.

. . . The overall evaluation of the Seminar is it is a worthwhile program which inculcates each individual, regardless of Service or Agency, with the belief that he is a member of a team, employed in a collective effort in the furtherance of the interest of the U.S. Government. . . ."

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36th Session (26 February - 22 March 1968)

" . . . I feel that the Agency participation in the Seminar was worthwhile. The strong participation of Agency personnel in discussions and in the question and answer periods had an overall salutary effect on all participants. I believe most if not all the personnel of other participating agencies were impressed with the caliber of our personnel and were won over, so to speak. Unfortunately the Department that should have provided the most participants provided only one. This left our personnel for the most part talking to themselves.

For the most part, I believe the Agency students derived considerable benefit from the morning sessions. I felt that about sixty percent of the speakers presented worthwhile information while the other forty percent should be replaced or dropped. The afternoon sessions were of only marginal value. . . ."

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 36th Session (26 February - 22 March 1968)

"I feel that the participation of the Agency in the NIS is very productive in providing personnel of other agencies of the Government with a clear view of our role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Possibly it should even be increased, as it was my impression that many of the personnel of other agencies had a hazy, incomplete, and often erroneous impression of many aspects of the Agency's functions. The candidness and honesty of the presentations by Mr. Helms and Colonel White appealed strongly to most of the students with whom I talked, and the panel discussion generated as much favorable comment from the students as any presentation on the program. The straightforwardness of the formal presentations seemed to remove the reticence of many of the students, and I had several informal talks with members of the seminar that indicated their lack of and desire for a better understanding of the Agency's objectives and methods of operation. For this reason I feel that additional participation by the Agency in either a formal or informal manner would be beneficial.

I feel that the benefit of the NIS is not at all restricted to those Agency personnel with immediate assignments overseas. Headquarters personnel in all operational branches could learn much that would aid them in their jobs by the exposure to the presentations and personnel of other U.S. agencies concerned with internal defense. . . .

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In my opinion, the NIS is making a valuable contribution to the overall U.S. effort to produce a coordinated effort in the field of overseas internal defense. . . ."

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 36th Session (26 February - 22 March 1968)

"Quite frankly, I question the value to our students of much of the content of the NIS as currently constituted. To take the specific example of the five AF officers in Team III. Each student has in fact served a considerable period of time in dealing with underdeveloped countries, both in Washington and in the field. Each has in fact both field experience in dealing with insurgency problems, and Headquarters experience in dealing with other government agencies. Much of the ground covered, therefore, is not new. We all know a great deal about problems of underdevelopment and in truth do not need a rather elemental and theoretical coverage of this subject. Furthermore, we are all well acquainted with the Country Team concept and the activities and capabilities of other agencies and thus do not need as extensive a coverage of this aspect as is given.

What I, and I am certain others, could have used is a much heavier concentration on operationally-oriented discussion of the ways and means of dealing with counter-insurgency problems. For instance, more emphasis could have been placed on case studies such as that of Thailand (quite useful) which should be explored in depth. . . .

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One glaring weakness in our course was the virtual dearth of coverage of the panoply of communist organizations active in promoting and exploiting insurgency. A great deal of attention is paid to our bureaucratic organization for coping with this threat but almost none to the nature of the communist operational tools which we seek to combat. This should be a principal contribution of the agency. Apart from [REDACTED] excellent presentation on Latin America, however, very little was said on this subject. . . .

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The NIS does provide a useful opportunity for our officers to take time to read and reflect on these problems freed from day-to-day work pressures. . . .

I would conclude that agency participation is probably more valuable to other participants than vice versa. We have accumulated a body of experience and expertise which is not matched by other agencies. It is probably unavoidable, therefore, that we have more to offer and less to gain in the NIS."

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[REDACTED] - 36th Session (26 February - 22 March 1968)

"The principal value to the Agency, at least as I observed during our class, was that it gave the representatives from other government agencies an opportunity to mix with our Agency personnel, to work on problems of mutual interest with them and thereby obtain a better conception and understanding of our Agency and its activities.

The reverse of the above is certainly true as far as our students

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are concerned. I for one had an opportunity to update myself on what other Agencies are doing -- or trying to do in the area of my pending assignment. Of additional value is an opportunity to remove yourself from your own parochial Agency's interests for a few weeks and take a close look at the many other trouble spots around the globe and the U.S. Government's involvement therein. . . .

In the particular case of our course I do not feel that the seminar accomplished its complete objectives because of the limited attendance of State Department (1); and USIA officers (2). This factor limited the Country team discussions. . . ."

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